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IX. CASES OF AGENCY.

(1.) In general.-Perhaps the most important exception to
the rule in question is that it will not be applied to cases where the
wife has acted for the husband in his bhsiness, and by his authority
and consent; he thereby adopts her acts and will be bound by any
admission or acknowledgment made by her respecting that business,
and her testimony will be admissible touching anything she did as
his agent, or within the scope of her delegated authority: Wheeler
& Wilson Mfg. Go. v. Tinsley, 75 Mo. 458; Degenhaart v.
Schmidt, 7 Mo. App. 117; Lunay v. TVantyne, 40 Yt. 501;
Birdsall v. Dunn, 16 Wis. 235; Chundt v. Laison, 43 Id. 536.
There are many cases asserting the admissibility of evidence of the
admissions of the wife made out of court as to her agency and her
acts done under it; but our purpose here is to ascertain her competency as a witness testifying on the trial respecting such acts, and
the factum of her agency. See Emerson v. Blondin, 1 Esp. 142;
1 Str. 527; B. N. P. 287; Anderson v. Saunderson, Holt N. P.
591 ; White v. Cuyler, 6 T. R. 176 ; Clifford v. Burton, 1 Bing.
199; Tenner v. Lewis, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 38; 1iley v. Suydam,
4 Barb. (N. Y.) 222; Williamson v. -M1orton,2 Md. Ch. 74;
Hughes v. Stokes, 1 Hayw. (N. 0.) 372; Curtis v. Ingham, 2
Vt. 289.
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(2.) Wife eomvetent.-The English rule was narrower than
the one just stated. The admissions and declarations of the wife
were admitted, and so far she was treated like any other agent, but
she could not be called as a witness, while an ordinary agent could
be : 1 Phil. Ev. sect. 83.
This distinction does not seem to have met with favor in this
country, except, perhaps, in Arkansas. A late case in that state
holds that neither husband nor wife can testify for or against the
other in civil cases ; not even when one acts as agent for the other:
Watkins v. Turner, 34 Ark. 663. Compare fagness v. Walker,
26 Id. 870. The American rule seems to be that a wife is not a
competent witness for her husband, exeeyt as to matters in which
she has acted as his agent. The question whether she so acted in
a given transaction (though she is probably a competent witness
upon that question) is to be determined by the court before she is
admitted to testify in chief; and the proof of her agency should
generally be elicited by direct interrogatories on that subject:
Chundt v. Laison, 43. Wis. 536; Burke v. Savage, 13 Allen
(Mass.) 408 ; where she was held a competent witness to prove her
agency, as well as her acts as agent. In Illinois, she is placed on
the footing of a feme sole, so far as respects her competency to
testify concerning transactions in which she acted as her husband's
agent: -Poppersv. Miller, 14 Ill. App. 87.. In Indiana, it is held
that communications between husband and wife relating to an
agency conferred by him upon her are not confidential communications nor inadmissible in evidence: Schmied v. Frank, 86 Ind.
250. But the contrary doctrine is maintained in Tennessee :
Washington v. Bedford, 10 Lea 243. During her husband's absence from home the wife acts as his agent in the care and protection of his property within the home limits, without any express.
direction or agreement, and is competent to testify as to what she
does in that behalf in any action by or against him : Fisherv. Conway, 21 Kan. 18; Town v. Lampshire, 37 Vt. 52. If she keeps
his accounts for him, she may testify that she made the.entries by
his directions and in his presence: Littlefield v. Bice, 10 Metc.
(Ass.) 287. Being authorized by him to take care of his property
and to notify the insurers in case of loss, she may testify in an
action on the policy as to facts connected with his loss, and the
insurers cannot show by her that he did not hold the legal title to
the land, such -act not being within the scope of her agency:
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O' Connor v. H1artford Fire Ins. Go., 31 Wis. 161. Where he is
sued for property pledged with her for money loaned, she may
testify as to what contract she made with'the plaintiff, and that she
acted as her husband's agent in making it: Summer v. Cooke, 51
Ala. 521. If her husband gives her a note to collect she may
prove her acts within the scope of her agency, in her husband's
suit against the estate of the deceased maker: Bngenann v. mnmel,
59 Wis. 249. Where, through his acts of cruelty, she is compelled
to leave his house, she may testify against him, when sued for necessaries furnished to her, and prove such acts of cruelty ; and, in such
a case, it is immaterial whether his liability be placed on the
ground of her implied agency to contract for the necessaries, or on that
of his marital duty: Bach v. Parmely, 35 Wis. 233.
(3.) Wife incompetent.-Ordinarily there must be proof of
authority conferred, or ratification by the husband, or the wife will
not be a competent witness to establish that a contract entered into
by her with a third person is the contract of her husband made by
her as his agent: Bliss v. F;ranklyn, 13 Allen (Mass.) 244. In
Vermont, it is held that where the husband is temporarily absent
from home for a day, leaving his wife without any special charge
or agency, except i such as married women living and keeping
house with their husbands would have in such cases," she is not
his agent so as to be competent to testify for him as to matters
transpiring during his absence: Bates v. Cilley, 47 Vt. 1. With
all due respect, the writer submits that, as a general proposition,
this is not sound law. Again, where the husband is sued for the
price of goods purchased by him in the wife's presence, she assisting in their selection, she is not competent, on the ground of
agency, to prove that the goods were furnished on the credit of a
third person in the payment of the latter's indebtedness to the husband: Tripp v. Barker, 78 Ill. 146. So, it is held, that merely
sending the wife to collect payment for goods sold by the husband
does not make her his agent within the rule: Bobertson v. Brost,
83 Ill. 116. And where a wife, being requested by her husband
to call into their house the indorser of a note held by the husband,
isked the indorser "whether he was going to pay the note," she
was held not to be the husband's agent in such a sense as to be
competent to testify to admissions made to her by the indorser
which would render him liable on the note without presentment and
demand of the maker: Hale v. Danforth, 40 Wis. 382.
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(4.) Hfsband as agent of wife.-The same principle by the
application of which the wife is-permitted to testify as to her acts
done as the agent of her husband, also admits the husband as a witness for his wife, as to acts done by him as her authorized agent :
Bobby v. Wisconsin Bank, 17 Wis. 167; Haule v. Kreihn, 65
Mo. 202 ; Ghelsey v. (helsey, 54 Mo. 347. Thus, he may testify
as to what disposition he has made of money belonging to her separate
estate: Robison v. Robison, 44 Ala. 227. He may show what he
did in her absence as well as-what he did in her presence: M~ark v.
Steinfert, 89 Wis. 870. And he may also prove the factum of his
agency and its extent: Owen v. Gawley, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 52 ; see,
also, Arndt v. ifarshaw, 53 Wis. 269. But, as in the wife's case,
an agency must appear; his action withoit her knowledge or consent will not constitute him her agent: Case v. Colter, 66 Ind.
836. Nor will the fact that he went with her when she made the
bargain, and afterwards "1 about the matter of pay," without more,
have that effect: Waggonseller v. Rexford, 2 111. App. 445.
X.

EFFECT OF CONSENT, OR RELEASE OF INTEREST.

(1.) Consent.-Upon the effect of the husband's consent that
the wife be admitted as a witness against him, the authorities are
not in harmony. Some of them take the ground that it is only
the interest of the husband which excludes her, and inasmuch as
an interested witness is competent to tesiify against his interest,
provided he consents to do so, the wife may be properly admitted
to testify against her husband's interest, he consenting that she do
so: Pedley v. Wellesly, 3 Car. & P. 558.
But the better opinion seems to favor her exclusion as a witness
against her husband, even though he consents; for the reason that
the interest of the husband in preserving the confidence placed in
The preservation of
her is not the only ground of the rule.
domestic tranquillity, and the diminution of temptations to commit
perjury, are objects in which society at large is interested, and to
admit her as a witness under such circumstances would be opposed
to a souild public policy. See Barker v. -Dixey, Cas. t. Hardw.
.264; Sedgwick v. Watkins, 1 Yes. Jr. 49; Randall's Case, 5 City
H. Rec. (N. Y.) 141, 153, 154; -Davisv. Dinwoody, 4 T. R. 679.
(2.) Release of interest.-Clinging to the mistaken idea that
individual interest, and not public policy, afforded the ground of the
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rule, several highly respectable courtshave held that a conveyance
by husband and wife to the wife (Meredith v. Hughes, 28 Ga. 571),
or by the husband to the wife (Weems v. Weems, 19 Md. 334), or
by both to their children (Meredith v. Hughes, supra; contra,
Locke v. Noland, 11 Ala. 249), of all their interest in the issue on
trial, rendered them, or the one making such transfer, competent to
testify in the cause, notwithstanding the existence of the marital
relation. So, also, it has been decided, that the wife of a sole
executor of a will, who has renounced, is competent to prove its
execution as a will of real estate- Daniel v. Proctor, 1 Dev. L.
(N. 0.) 428; but compare Huic v. O'Connell, 2 Jones L. (N. 0.)
455; that the wife of one of several co-defendants in foreclosure,
who suffers the bill to be taken pro confesso as against her, thereby
becomes competent for the other defendants: Hadley v. Chapin, 11
Paige (N. Y.) 245; that where the payee of a note endorses it to
a third person, taking a release from liability thereon, his wife
becomes competent for the holder: Bisbing v. Graham,14 Penn.
St. 14; Armstrong v. Noble, 55 Vt. 428; and that a wife, in the
absence of her husband, who has been released from liability in the
suit, is a competent witness therein: Peaceable v. Keep, 1 Yeates
(Pa.) 576. See, also, Borneman v. Sidlinger, 21 Me. 185; Thomas
v. Oatheral, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 23. But it is difficult to bring these
cases within the true principle of the rule of exclusion, i. e., that it
is not interest only, but public policy which closes the door of the
witness box.
XI. SURVING HUSBAD.-While, as we have seen, the dissolution of the marriage relation by the death of one.of the parties,
has not the effect of removing the incompetency of the other to
disclose matters protected by the rule excluding husband and wife
as witnesses for or against each other (supra,I.), yet, one having
died, the other is competent as to anything the knowledge of which
was not obtained through the privacy of the marriage relation:
Wooley v. Turner, 13 Ind. 253; Haugh v. Blythe, 20 Id. 24;
lswick v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.) 155; English v. Cropper, 8 Id. 292. But the husband cannot testify to conversations
between himself and his deceased wife: Dye v. Davis, 65 Ind.
474 ; or against the interests of her estate: Succession of Wade,
21 La. Ann. 343; but see Reilly v. Succession of Reilly, 28 Id.
669, and Ames's Succession, 33 Id. 1317, which two cases seem to
lean the other way. See, also, Wood v. Bwillar, 40 Iowa 591;
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Jackson v. Brooks, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 426; Wallis v. Britton, 1
Har. & J. (Md.) 478; Ayres v. Ayres, 11 Gray (Mass.) 130; William & Mary College v. Powell, 12 .Gratt. (Va.) 372.
XIL WIDQ.-SO, also, the widow is a competent witness as to
matters in which her deceased husband was interested, unless she
acquired her knowledge of the facts through confidential communications from him: Ryan v. Follansbee,47 N. H. 100; Jackson
v. Barron, 37 Id. 494; Coinell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Barr (Pa.)
364; in which latter case she is incompetent: lingo v. State, 29
Ga. 470; Gray v. Cole, 5 Harr. (Del.) 418. She may testify as
to a conversation had in her presence, or overheard by her, between
her husband and a third person: -Prattv. -Delavan,17. Iowa 807;
Stuhlmuller v. -Ewing, 39 Miss. 447; Mercer v. Patterson, 41
Ind. 440; Griffin v. Smith, 45 Id. 366; Ployd v. Miller, 61 Id.
224. She may piove her husband's acts, not affecting his character:
MeGuire v. Maloney, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 224; or such of his business
transactions as were observed by her during his life, or came to her
knowledge through sources other than communications by him to
her: Spivey v. Platon, 29 Ark. 603; Powell v. Powell, 2 N. E.
Rep. (Ill.) 162; Short v. Tinsley, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 897; Stein v.
Weidman, 20 Mo. 17; Gaskill v. King, 12 Ired. L. (N. 0.) 211;
Robb'8 Appeal, 98 Penn. St. 501.
Thus, she may testify as to the execution, loss and contents of a
bond given to her husband: Carpenterv. Dame, 10 Ind. 125; or
that goods were received by the executor of her husband for which
he has not accounted: Sherwood v. Bill, 25 Mo. 891; or that a
deed of conveyance in which she joined with her husband was only
intended to operate as a mortgage: Price v. Joyner, 8 Hawks (N.
C.) 418; contra, Ecleford v..De Kay, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 565; or that.
such a deed, so executed by her, was not fraudulent under the
statute of 13 Elizabeth: Chambers v. Spencer, 5 Watts (Pa.) 404;
or that a parol gift claimed to have been made by her husband, was,
in fact, a loan: Hay v. Hay, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 384; or that a
pretended purchase from him was never consummated: Keys v.
Baldwin, 83 Tex. 666. She is also a competent witness in an
action against her husband's administrator for her board: Bomans
v. Hay, 12 Iowa 270. She is competent for the executors when
she has no interest in the result of the case: Gebhart v. Shindle,
15 S. & R. (Pa.) 237.
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Where the litigation concerns the real estate of her deceased husband, she is not a competent witness, where the result can either
increase or reduce her dower: Wade v. Johnson, 5 Humph.
(Tenn.) 117; s. P. Chaney v. Moore, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 48; but if,
in such a case, she is not entitled to dower: Wallinford v. _iske,
24 Me. 886, or has released her right: -Dobsonv. Bacey, 8 N. Y.
216; Gayle v. Morrissey, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 445, or received her
dower by consent of the heirs: Morris v. Harris,9 Gill (Md.) 19,.
she is competent.
XIII. DIVORCED SPOUSE.-Nor will the dissolution of the marriage relation by judicial decree of divorce, or nullity of marriage,
restrain the operation of the rule we are examining. As was
well said by Lord ALVANTLEY, " It never shall be endured, that the
confidence which the law has created while the parties remained in
the most intimate of all relations, shall be broken whenever, by the
misconduct of one party, the relation has been dissolved :" Monroe
v. Twistleton, Peake Ev. App. lxxxvii. (xci.) ; Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, 6 East 192; .Dokerv. Easler,Ry.& M. 198. Thus, a wife
who has been divorced from her husband continues to be incompetent to testify against him in respect to transactions which took
place prior to the divorce and during coverture : Barnesv. Camack,
1 Barb. (N. Y.) 392; Gook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526; Perry v.
Randall, 83 Ind. 143; or in his favor, in an action by him against
a third person for seducing her: Bea v. Tucker, 51 Ill. 110. See
infra, XVI. She cannot testify to threats made to her by her husband, to compel her signature to a conveyance alleged to be void
for duress: Anderson v. Anderson, 9 Kan. 112. Nor is she competent when the proceeding is instituted to set aside the divorce
between herself and herdeceased husband: .Fidelity Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Penn. St. 242; Peterson v. Peterson, 13 Phil. (Pa.) 82.
It has been held, however, that she may be permitted as a witness against the former husband, to prove a communication not
confidential, but which it must have been intended by him at the
time, she should make known to the public: Crook v. Henry, 25
Wis. 569; see, also, Storms v. Storms, 3 Bush (Ky.) 77, as to the
competency of a divorced husband.
XIV. CASES OF PERSONAL INJURIES.-Where the ground of
action is a personal injury sustained by the wife at the hands of a
third person, the authorities are not in entire harmony as to the
husband's competency to testify. In Georgia, the wife having been
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assaulted, the liusband was not permitted to testify that she delayed
to complain to him: Goodrum v. State, 60 Ga. 509 ; see also Pillow v. Bushnell, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 156. In Wisconsin, when both
sue for injuries to the person of the wife, caused by the defendant's
negligence, the husband is deemed the real party in interest, and
may testify in support of the action, whatever the rule may be as to
actions in which he is only a nominal party: Kaime v. Omro Trustees, 49 Wis. 371 ; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240 ; and the wife
is also competent in such cases tried in the United States Circuit
sitting in that state: Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 528.
The rule was the same in Massachusetts, under chapter 188 of the
Act of 1856: Snell v. Westport, 9 Gray (Mass.) 321; but see
Bunker v. Bennett, 103 Mass. 516, where a contrary rule is laid
down under a later statute; and is the same in Vermont: Simp kins v. Eddie, 56 Vt. 612. In New.Hampshire, where the husband died after'the injury to the wife, but before suit brought, the
wife was held a competent witness: Winship v. .Enfield, 42 N. H.
197. And in Vermont, where the wife sued a liquor dealer, under
the "civil damage act," for injuries sustained by reason of the intoxication of her husband, the latter was held a competent witness
for the plaintiff: Acts 1874, No. 27; Snow v. Carpenter, 49 Vt.
426. As to actions for malicious prosecution, see Anderson v.
Friend, 71 Ill. 475; Mitchinson v. Cross, 58 Id. 366. Actions
for slander of the wife, see Hawver v. Eawver, 78 1ll. 412; Mousler v. .arding, 83 Ind. 176 ; Bennifield v. fypres, 38 Ind. 498 ;
Duval v. Davey, 32 Ohio St. 604. Actions for mal-practice, see
Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103.
XV. ACTIONS FOR DIVORCE, OR TO ANNUL THE MARRIAGE.-

The action being for divorce, the husband has been held competent
to prove the wife's desertion of him: Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 'Col
348. So, also, the wife being complainant, she was allowed to testify as to her husband's habits of intoxication and general treatment
of her: Smith v. Smith, 77 Ind. 80; Burdette v. .Burdette, 2
Mackey (D. C.) 469. But the great weight of authority, especially
where the ground of divorce is adultery, excludes both parties from
testifying except to sustain the validity of the marriage to dissolve
which the action is brought. Such is the law in Louisiana t Dillon
v. Dillon, 32 La. Ann. 643; Daspit v. Bhringer, Id. 1174; see,
also, Shantz v Stoll, 34 Id. 1237; and, until very recently, in New
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Jersey: Marsh v. Marsh, 2 Stew. (N. J.) 396; Dougherty v.
v. Dougherty, 5 Id. 32 ; and in New York: Van Cort v. Van Cort
4 Edw. (N. Y.) 621 ; Bivenburgh v. .ivenburgh, 47 Barb. (N. Y.)
419; ifennessey v. Rennessey, 58 How. Pr. 304; Lincoln v. Lincoln, 6 Rob. (N. T.) 525; Finn v. Finn, 12 Hun 839; and see,
Anable v. Anable, 24 How. Pr. 92. It seems the husband may
prove the wife's impotence: Barringer v. Barringer, 69 N. C
179; but not her adultery: Cook v. Cook, 46 Ga. 808. In Pennsylvania, the parties to the divorce may testify in their own favor,
but cannot be compelled to testify against themselves: Bronson v.
Bronson, 8 Phil. (Pa.) 261. They are excluded in Texas: Cornish
v. Cornish, 56 Tex. 564, and admitted in Massachusetts, where the
proceeding is for a decree of nullity, under the statute: Gen. St.
ch. 107, § 4; Foss v. Fo8s, 12 Allen (Mass.) 26.
When the proceeding is a collateral one, e. g., when a creditor of
the husband sues to annul a judgment of separation of property between the husband and wife, the latter has been held competent to
testify: Keller v. Vernon, 23 La. Ann. 164.
XVI. ACTIONS FOR ABDUCTION, OR

FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSA-

TION.-It is held in Minnesota, that even in an action by the husband against one who entices away the wife, when the defence is
his ill-treatment of her, the wife cannot be a witness against her
husband without his consent: ifuot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68; but the
contrary was held in New York, in a proceeding to regain the custody of the wife by the writ of habeas c opus: People v. Mercein,
8 Paige (N. Y.) 47, and also in Pennsylvaniiwhere her declarations immediately before and at the time of her leaving him,
respecting his ill-treatment of her, were admitted in behalf of the
defendant charged with enticing her away: Gilchristv. Bale, 8
Watts (Pa.) 355.
In actions for criminal conversation the majority of the adjudications exclude the wife from testifying for the plaintiff: Carpenter
v. White, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 291 ; Hicks v. Bradner, 2 Abb. (N. Y.)
Abb. Dec. 362; Mathews v. Yerex, 48 Mich. 361, unless a divorce
has been obtained previous to the trial, when she is competent as
to facts occurring after the divorce, in which her husband did not
participate : Cross v. 1utlidge, 81 Ill. 26 6; or, according to several
highly respectable authorities, even to prove the charge laid in the
declaration: Dickerman v. Graves, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 308; Bateliff
VOL. XXXIV.-54
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v. Wales, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 63.; Woltrich v.
601.

_reeman, 71 N. v.

XVII. CRIMINAL ACTIONS.

(1.) In general.-We have already seen that one of the exceptions to the common-law rule excluding husband and wife as witnesses, is, that in collateral proceedings, they may testify to facts
which even tend to criminate each other: supra, VIII.; Commonwealth v. Reid, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 385 ; s. c. 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 132 ; but
see State v. Wilson, 2 Yr. (N. J.) 77. Where, however, a criminal
prosecution is instituted against either spouse, the other is generally
excluded as a witness either for or against the one on trial, both on
grounds of. public policy, and in order t6 lessen the temptation to
commit perjury: Luca8 v. State, 23 Conn. 18; William v. State,
33 Ga. (Supp.) 85; Byrd v. State, 57 Miss. 243; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178 ; Wilke v. People, 53 N. Y. 525 ;
People v. Briggs, 60 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 17 ; People v. Moore, 65
Id. 177; Taulman v. State, 37 Ind. 353 ; and the so-called "enabling acts" have n6t affected this rule, their operation being, for
the most part, confined to civil causes: Turpin v. State, 55 Md.
462; Com. v. Gannon, 97 Mass. 547; Com. v. Welch, Id. 593;
State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335; State v. Moulton, 48 N. H. 485;
People v. Crandon, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 490; but compare People v.
Comm'rs of Charities, 9 Id. 212 ; Steen v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333;
Shultz v. State, 32 Id. 276; Gibson v. Cor., 87 Penn. St. 253.
Where, however, the cohabitation is meretricious, and not pursuant to a lawful marriage, the rule has no application: Ricken-.
striker v. State, 31 Ark. 207 ; Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642; and
the fact that the alleged marital relation does not exist may be
proved by the witness on the voir dire: State v. Brown, 28 La.
Ann. 279. But the converse, it seems, is not true, i. e., where the
prosecution has shown an actual marriage between the defendant
and one of its female witnesses, prima facie valid and in good
faith, upon which the defendant might reasonably and honestly rely
as valid, and upon which he did rely at the trial, the prosecution
-cannot introduce opposing testimony in order to establish the invalidity of the marriage, so as to make the alleged wife a competent
witness against the defendant: Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84.
Various statutory modifications of the rule have been made in
many of the states; thus, in Kansas, the wife of the accused is
competent for the state if she voluntarily testifies against her hus-
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band. She cannot be compelled to do so: State v. H~cCord, 8
Kan. 232. But she may be so compelled in Maine: Stat. 1873,
ch. 137, sect. 5; State v. Black, 63 Me. 210. In New York she
may testify in her husband's favor, but cannot be compelled to be
a witness against him. The husband, however, may compel her
testimony, and his failure to call her is properly the subject of comment to the jury: People v. Hovey, 92 N. Y. 554; s. c., 29
Hun 382. In North Carolina and Rhode Island, where the husband is the complainant against the one charged with assault the
wife has been held a competent witness in the case, either to support the prosecution or to contradict her husband's testimony for the
state: State v. Parrott,79 N. C. 615; State v. Borden, 6 R. I.
495. In Texas, husband and wife are competent for each other in
criminal cases, but not against each other: Griffin v. State, 82
Tex. 164 (where the right of the prosecution to cross-examine was
denied); Creamer v. State, 84 Tex. 178 (where such right was sustained); and if either be competent against the person on trial the
other is also: Daffin v. State, 11 Tex. App. 76.
(2.) Offences committed by one againstthe other.-Where the
offence on trial is a personal injury alleged to have been committed
by the husband upon the wife, or vice versa, the injured spouse is a
competent witness in favor of the one on trial: People v. .Fitzpatrick, 5 Park. Or. (N. Y.) 26 ; compare Bihin v. Bikin, 17 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 19, or on the part of the prosecution: People v. Carpenter, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 580. Thus, the husband being indicted
for assault and battery upon his wife, she is competent to testify
against him: United States v. Fitton, 4 Cranch C. 0. 668; United States v. Smallwood, 5 Id. 85 ; Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 851 ;
s. a., 45 Am. Rep. 412, at least, where a lasting injury is inflicted
or threatened to be inflicted upon her: State v. Hussey, Busb. L.
(N. C.) 123; State v. Davidson, 77 N. 0. 522, or where no other
person was present when the offence was committed: State v. Davis,
8 Brev. (S. 0.) 8 ; and it seems she is compellable to testify in such
cases: Turner v. State, supra (which case decides that it is her
privilege to testify or not as she may elect. Her husband cannot
complain of the action of the court in compelling her to give eviSo, also, she may testify against her
dence over his objection).
to poison her: People v. Northtrial
for
attempting
on
his
husband
an instrument with intent
or
for
using
rup, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 147,
to cause her to miscarry: State v. Dyer, 59 Mo. 308, or on his

428

THE COMPETENCY, AS WITNESSES,

trial for abandoning her: State v. Brown, 67 N. C. 470 (only to prove
the fact of abandonment, however, not to prove the marriage). She
cannot, however, testify against him on his trial for conspiring to
obtain a divorce, unless the indictment charges the commission of
personal violence upon her, or the intention to commit it: Cor. v.
Mcewan, 1 Pa. L. J. Rep. 140, or on his trial for suborning witnesses to wrong her in a judicial proceeding: People v. Carpenter,
9 Barb. (N. Y.) 580. Nor can she be a witness against him on his
trial for the larceny of her property: Overton v. State, 43 Tex.
616; B. v. Brittleton, 12 Q. B. D. 266; s. c., 32 W. R. 463, or
for incest with her daughter by a former marriage: Compton v.
State, 13 Tex. App. 271; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 703; overruling
Morrill v. State, 5 Tex. App. 447, and Roland v. State, 9 Id.
277.
On the other hand, on her husband's trial for assault and battery upon herself, she may testify in his favor to disprove the
charge: State v. N'eill, 6 Ala. 685; Com. v. Muryhy, 4 Allen
(Mass.) 491; Tucker v. State, 71 Ala. 342; for it is well settled
that when, in any case, husband and wife are competent witnesses
against each other, they are also competent witnesses for each
other: Tucker v. State, 71 Ala. 342. So, where the wife is prosecuted for assaulting the husband, he is a competent witness against
her: Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87 ; see, also, People v. Marble,
38 Mich. 117 ; contra, Turnbull v. Com., 79 Ky. 495.
(3.) Wife of party jointly indicted.-Another exception to
the general rule is that where, upon a joint indictment, there is a
separate trial the husband or wife of the defendant not put upon
trial, is not necessarily incompetent as a witness for the prosecution. If willing to testify, he or she is competent, except, perhaps,
where the offence is in its nature joint, as in conspiracy: Cor. v.
Reid, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 385; s. c. 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 182; State v.
Dawdy, 14 Rich. (S. C.) 87, where the acquittal of one defendant
works the acquittal of the others: United States v. Addate, 6
Blatchf. (U. S.) 76 ; Wiliams v. State, 69 Ga. 11 ; -but see to the
contrary, State v. Bradley, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 168; State v. Mc Grew,
13 Id. 316; State v. Burlingham, 15 Me. 104. Where the husband is suspected, but not indicted, and the defendant seeks to
show the husband to be the guilty party, the wife may'testify to
facts exculpptory of her husband: Pincher v. State, 58 Ala.
215.
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So also, the wife of one of three jointly indicted defendants is
competent against the other two, after the indictment has been dismissed as to her husband: Bay v. Com., 12 Bush (Ky.) 897;
but not, it seems, before such dismissal : Dill v. State, 1 Tex. App.
278. And where the husband is defaulted on his recognilance, the
wife becomes competent for the other defendant: State v. Worthing,
81 Me. 62. Indeed, she is generally held competent in such cases
when she is offered as a witness in favor of the defendant on trial :
Thompson v. Com., 1 Metc. (Ky.) 13; Cornelius v. Com., 3 Id.
481; State v. Burnside, 87 Mo. 843; Com. v. Manson, 2 Ashm.
(Pa.) 31; Moffit v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 99; Workman v.
State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 425 ; although respectable cases are not
lacking which hold the other way : United States v. Wade, 2
Cranch 0. C. 680 ; Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 36 ; Pullen v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 48.
Where the trial as well as the indictment is joint, it is pretty well
settled that the wife of one defendant is not a competent witness
for any of the others: Commonwealth v. Easland, 1 Mass. 15;
Com. v. Robinson, 1 Gray (Mass.) 555; State v. Waterman, 15
S. 0. 540; Mask v. State, 32 Miss. 405; but see Xorrisey v.
People, 11 Mich. 327; State v. Waterman, 1 Nev. 543.
(4.) Wife of accomplice, or state's witness.-Where the husband has testified as an accomplice, or state's witness, his wife is a
competent witness to corroborate his testimony : State v. Moore, 25
Iowa 128 ; H7askins v. People, 16 N. Y. 844 ; Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 12 Bush (Ky.) 181; Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11;
especially where he has not been indicted, though evidently an
accomplice: Powell v. State, 58 Ala. 862. So, also, she may prove
any independent facts not sworn to by her husband, and not forming any part of his acts, although those facts fasten a guilty
knowledge on the defendant: United States v. Horn, 5 Blatchf.
(U. S.) 102. She may also testify on the other side, to show that
her husband testified under a bias against the defendant, but not to
contradict him: Cornelius v. State, 12 Ark. 782. See, also, Clubb
v. State, 14 Tex. App. 192 ; State v. Mooney, 64 N. 0. 54.
(5.) Wife of person injured by the crime.-At common law,
where the person whose goods were stolen was not interested in the
prosecution of the thief, his 'wife was a competent witness for
the prosecution, but where the husband was himself disqualified by
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reason of an interest in the fine, she was not competent: 'United
States v. S/orter, 1 Cranch C. C. 315. But this rule of exclusion
of the wife because of the husband's interest in the event is now
swept away by the enabling acts, along with the incompetency of
the husband himself-the person injured-on account of his
interest. When the prosecution is for the homicide of the husband,
the widow is a competent witness to prove his dying declarations:
State v. Ryan, 80 La. Ann., part 2, 1176.
(6.) Rules peculiar to prosecutions for adultery.-Upon the
question whether, upon a criminal prosecution for adultery, the husband or wife, of either of the guilty persons, shall be admitted tc
testify for .the prosecution, the decisions are in direct conflict.
Some of them hold that under statutes permitting husband and wife
to testify against one another on a criminal prosecution, for an
offence committed by one against the other, the one may testify
against the otlier on an indictment of the other for adultery :
Roland v. State, 9 Tex. App. 277: s. c. 85 Am. Rep. 743;
Alonzo v. State, 15 Tex. App. 378 ; Morrill v. State, 5 Id. 447 ;
Lord v. State, 23 N. W. Rep. 507. In Wisconsin it is held that
after a divorce 4 vinculo, the husband is competent to prove the
marriage on an indictment against another for adultery with the
wife, before divorce: State v. Dudley, 7 Wis. 664.
Many cases, however, of equal respectability are found which lay
down the contrary rule. Thus, the Supreme Court of Alabama
holds that the husband of a woman jointly indicted with her paramour for living in adultery, is incompetent to testify against either
of them: Cotton v. State, 62 Ala. 12. In North Carolina, he
cannot testify against the female defendant (his wife), even though
he may have obtained an absolute divorce before the trial of the
indictment: State v. Jones, 89 N. C. 559 (where, however, he was
permitted to testify in her favor) ; nor can he testify for the prosecution in Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Gordon, 2 Brewst. (Pa.)
569; Commonwealth v. -lohr, 8 Crim. L. Mag. 841; and the
same has been held in Maine, Massachusetts and Texas: State v.
Welch, 26 Me. 30; Commonwealth v. Sparks, 7 Allen (Mass.)
534; Thomas v. ,'tate, 14 Tex. App. 70; see also to same effect,.
State v. Gardner, 1 Root (Conn.) 485; Commonwealth v. Jailer,
1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 218; and see People v. Hendrickson, 19 N.
W. Rep. 169..

